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SECTION 357(c) AND THE CASH BASIS TAXPAYER
In a typical incorporation, an individual might transfer the
assets and liabilities of a going business to a corporation in exchange
for its capital stock. Since the inception of the income tax, Congress
has struggled with the problem of how such a transfer should be
treated for tax purposes. Prior to the enactment of the Revenue Act
of 1921,1 if an individual transferred assets to a corporation and
received stock in exchange, he was taxed to the extent that the fair
market value of the stock exceeded his basis in the assets.2 Recog-
nizing that such a procedure would seriously impede necessary in-
corporations,3 Congress provided in section 202 of the Revenue Act
of 1921 that no gain or loss would be realized by the transferor when
he conveyed assets to the corporation so long as he was in control
of the corporation after the transfer.4
Section 202 was reenacted without major modification in section
112(b) (5) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code.' Several important
facets of this complex problem still required clarification, however.
Under section 112(c) (1), if the transferor received from the cor-
poration "property or money" other than stock or securities in the
corporation, he would be taxed to the extent the fair market value
of that "other property or money" exceeded his basis in the assets
1 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227.
2 When property is exchanged for other property, the property received in
exchange shall for the purposes of determining gain or loss be treated as the
equivalent of cash to the amount of its fair market value, if any; but when
in connection with the reorganization, merger, or consolidation of a corpora-
tion a person receives in place of stock or securities owned by him new stock
or securities of no greater aggregate par or face value, no gain or loss shall
be deemed to occur from the exchange ....
Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1060.
3Under existing law "when property is exchanged for other property, the
property received in exchange shall, for the purpose of determining gain or
loss, be treated as the equivalent of cash to the amount of its fair market
value, if any . . . ." Probably no part of the present income tax law has
been productive of so much uncertainty or has more seriously interfered with
necessary business readjustments.
S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1921).
4 Section 202 provided in part:
(c) For the purposes of this title, on an exchange of property, real, personal
or mixed, for any other such property, no gain or loss shall be recognized
unless the property received in exchange has a readily realizable market
value; but even if the property received in exchange has a readily realizable
market value, no gain or loss shall be recognized-
(3) When (A) a person transfers any property, real, personal or
mixed, to a corporation, and immediately after the transfer is in con-
trol of such corporation ....
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 230.
5 No gain or loss shall be recognized if property is transferred to a corpo-
ration by one or more persons solely in exchange for stock or securities in
such corporation, and immediately after the exchange such person or persons
are in control of the corporation ....
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(b) (5), 53 Stat 37 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 351 (a)).
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transfered to the corporation.' This provision left an important
question unanswered: if the corporation assumed a debt of the trans-
feror, did such an assumption constitute "other property or money"
so that the transferor would be taxed to the extent of the assumption?
The Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Hendler7 answered
this question in the affirmative:
The transaction . . . under which the Borden Company
assumed and paid the debt and obligation of the Hendler
Company is to be regarded in substance as though the
$534,297.40 had been paid directly to the Hendler Com-
pany. . . . Its gain was as real and substantial as if the
money had been paid it and then paid over by it to its
creditors. The discharge of liability by the payment of the
Hendler Company's indebtedness constituted income to the
Hendler Company and is to be treated as such.8
In a typical incorporation of an existing business, the transferor
does not liquidate his liabilities before conveying his assets to the
corporation. Realizing, therefore, that the Hendler result could
defeat the purpose of section 112(b) (5),' Congress added section
112(k) to the Code. The new section provided that the assumption
of a liability by the corporation was not "other property or money"
unless it appeared either that the transferor's purpose in having the
corporation assume the debt was tax avoidance or that the transaction
was not a bona fide business deal."° The courts interpreted section
6 If an exchange would be within the provisions of subsection (b) . . . (5)
• . . if it were not for the fact that the property received in exchange consists
not only of property permitted by such paragraph . . . to be received without
the recognition of gain, but also of other property or money, then the gain,
if any to the recipient shall be recognized, but in an amount not in excess
of the sum of such money and the fair market value of such other property.
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(c) (1), 53 Stat. 39 (now IT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 351 (b)).
7 303 U.S. 564 (1938). Hendler arose under section 112(c) (1) of the Revenue
Act of 1928, ch. 852, 45 Stat. 817. Section 112(c) (1) was reenacted without major
change in section 112(c) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. See Walter F.
Haass, 37 B.T.A. 948 (1938); Brons Hotel, Inc., 34 B.T.A. 376 (1936).
8 303 U.S. at 566.
9 The recent Supreme Court case of United States v. Hendler . . . has been
broadly interpreted to require that, if a taxpayer's liabilities are assumed
by another party in what is otherwise a tax-free reorganization, gain is
recognized to the extent of the assumption. In typical transactions changing
the form or entity of a business it is not customary to liquidate the liabilities
of the business and such liabilities are almost invariably assumed by the
corporation which continues the business. Your committee therefore believes
that such a broad interpretation as is indicated above will largely nullify the
provisions of existing .law which postpone the recognition of gain in such
cases....
H.R. RPz. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1939).
' Where upon an exchange the taxpayer receives as part of the consideration
property which would be permitted by subsection (b) . . (5) . . . to be
received without the recognition of gain if it were the sole consideration, and
as part of the consideration another party to the exchange assumes a liability
of the taxpayer or acquires from the taxpayer property subject to a liability,
such assumption or acquisition shall not be considered as "other property or
money" received by the taxpayer within the meaning of subsection (c) . . . ;
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112(k) as overruling the Hendler result," and this section was subse-
quently reenacted without major change in sections 357(a) and (b)
of the 1954 Code. 12  A third provision was added to section 357,
however, which had no predecessor in the 1939 Code. Subsection
(c) provides that if the sum of the liabilities assumed by the cor-
poration plus the sum of the liabilities to which the transferred assets
are subject, exceed the total adjusted basis of the assets transferred,
then the transferor will be taxed on the difference.13 The committee
except that if, taking into consideration the nature of the liability and the
circumstances in the light of which the arrangement for the assumption or
acquisition was made, it appears that the principal purpose of the taxpayer
with respect to the assumption or acquisition was a purpose to avoid Federal
income tax on the exchange, or, if not such purpose, was not a bona fide busi-
ness purpose, such assumption or acquisition (in the amount of the liability)
shall, for the purposes of this section, be considered as money received by the
taxpayer upon the exchange ...
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(k), added by Revenue Act of 1939, ch. 247, § 213(a),
53 Stat. 870.
11 See, e.g., Helvering v. Taylor, 128 F.2d 885 (Zd Cir. 1942).
12 (a) GENERAL RuLE-Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), if-
(1) the taxpayer receives property which would be permitted to be
received under section 351 . . . without the recognition of gain if it
were the sole consideration, and (2) as part of the consideration,
another party to the exchange assumes a liability of the taxpayer,
or acquires from the taxpayer property subject to a liability,
then such assumption or acquisition shall not be treated as money or other
property ....
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 357(a).
For cases interpreting this subsection and its predecessor, § 112(k), see, e.g.,
Jewell v. United States, 330 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1964); Edwards Motor Transit Co.,
23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1968 (1964).
(b) TAx AvoiDANcE PumosE-
(1) IN GENERAL-If, taking into consideration the nature of the
liability and the circumstances in the light of which the arrangement
for the assumption or acquisition was made, it appears that the prin-
cipal purpose of the taxpayer with respect to the assumption or acqui-
sition described in subsection (a)-
(A) was a purpose to avoid Federal income tax on the
exchange, or
(B) if not such purpose, was not a bona fide business pur-
pose,
then such assumption or acquisition (in the total amount of the lia-
bility assumed or acquired pursuant to such exchange) shall, for
purposes of section 351 . . . be considered by the taxpayer on the
exchange.
INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, § 357(b).
For cases interpreting this subsection and its predecessor, § 112(k), see, e.g.,
Campbell v. Wheeler, 342 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1965); Bryan v. Commissioner, 281
F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 931 (1961); W. H. B. Simpson, 43
T.C. 900 (1965); F. W. Drybrough, 42 T.C. 1029 (1964); Estate of John G. Stoll,
38 T.C. 223 (1962). See Hertz, Getting Property Into and Out of the Corporation,
N.Y.U. 2 1sT INST. oN FFa. TAx 347, 352-53 (1963); Levitan, How to Reduce the
Amount of Equity Capital Invested in Controlled Corporations, 21 J. TAxATION 214,
216 (1964).
13 (c) LIABILITIES IN ExcEss OF BASIS-
(1) IN GENERL-In the case of an exchange-
(A) to which section 351 applies . . . if the sum of the
amount of the liabilities assumed, plus the amount of the lia-
bilities to which the property is subject, exceeds the total
of the adjusted basis of the property transferred pursuant
to such exchange, then such excess shall be considered as a
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reports dealing with the new subsection fail to specify Congress' reason
for adding to the earlier provisions.14 Therefore, in order to under-
stand what problem the new subsection was intended to cure, it is
necessary to examine the difficulty which arose under section 112(k).
MORTGAGED PROPERTY
The situation arising most frequently in cases involving the
assumption of liabilities is the transfer of mortgaged property. In
Crane v. Commissioner,5 the taxpayer was devised a parcel of land
and a building with an outstanding mortgage of $255,000.1 Some
years later she sold the building and land for $3,000 subject to the
mortgage. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the
amount of the original mortgage should be included in the taxpayer's
basis in the property and whether the outstanding mortgage assumed
by the purchaser should be included in the amount the taxpayer
realized on the sale. The taxpayer maintained that since she was not
personally liable on the mortgage, her gain on the sale was limited to
the cash she actually received. The Court, however, held that the
amount of the original mortgage was included in her basis in the
property' 7 and that the outstanding mortgage assumed by the pur-
chaser was included in the amount she realized on the sale. Further-
more, the Court held that her basis in the property had to be reduced
by the sum of the depreciation deductions she had taken on the build-
ing while she owned the property.' 8 Upon subtracting this adjusted
basis from the amount realized, the Court found her taxable gain to
be $24,000.'"
gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset or of
property which is not a capital asset, as the case may be.
(2) Exc~moNs-Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any exchange
to which-
(A) subsection (b) (1) of this section applies ....
INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 357(c).
For cases interpreting this subsection, see, e.g., Testor v. Commissioner, 327 F.2d
788 (7th Cir. 1964); Arthur L. Kniffen, 39 T.C. 553 (1962); Peter W. DeFelice,
25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 835 (1966). See notes 49, 50 infra and accompanying text,
14 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A129 (1954) ; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 270 (1954).
15 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
16The entire property was subject to the mortgage of $255,000. However, for
our purposes, only the value of the building is essential, since land is not a depreciable
asset. Therefore, the discussion below pertains only to the value of the building and
the figures are adjusted to exclude the value of the land. The figures below have
been rounded off.
-17 Since the taxpayer received the property from a decedent, the basis of the
property in her hands was its fair market value at the date of her husband's death.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1014(a). If the taxpayer had purchased the property, her
basis in the property would have been cost. INT. REV. CODE OP 1954, § 1012. See
Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455, 458 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 926 (1951).
18 Although the Court emphasized that the mortgage was not a personal obligation
of the taxpayer, subsequent decisions have not relied on this distinction, and the rule
now seems well established that depreciation deductions will reduce the taxpayer's
original basis regardless of whether or not he is personally liable on the mortgage.
1) Rounding off the figures in Crane and disregarding the value of the land, the
transaction was as follows:
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Three years later, when faced with a fact situation similar to that
presented in Crane,2" the First Circuit, in Parker v. Delaney,2 fol-
lowed the Supreme Court's approach in computing the taxpayer's gain
on the transfer. In a concurring opinion,2" Judge Magruder suggested
an alternative approach which has come to be known as the negative
basis doctrine. Judge Magruder argued that since the taxpayer in-
curred no out-of-pocket expenses in acquiring the mortgaged property,
his original basis ought to be zero. A negative basis resulted when the
depreciation deductions were subtracted from the zero basis in comput-
ing the adjusted basis. Under the terms of the sale the taxpayer was
relieved of the property and the obligation on the mortgage; there-
fore, Judge Magruder maintained, for tax purposes the amount realized
on the sale was also zero. The amount realized on the sale, zero,
Sale Price-Amount of mortgage $201,000
Boot for Building 2,000
Total amount realized on sale $203,000
Original basis in building $207,000
Minus: Depreciation deductions 28,000
Minus: Adjusted basis $179,000
Taxable gain $ 24,000
Boot is defined as cash or non-qualifying property received by the taxpayer in
addition to the qualifying property which he received without incurring a taxable
gain in the section 351 exchange. BrrrKER, FEDERAL INcoME, ESTATE AND G=FT
TAXATION 470 (3d ed. 1965).
The total boot received in the sale of the property was $3000. Since we are
concerned solely with the sale of the building, we have allotted $2000 of the boot to
the building and the remaining $1000 to the land.
For a critique of the Crane case, see Adams, Exploring the Outer Boundaries
of the Crane Doctrine: An Imaginary Supreme Court Opinion, 21 TAx L. REv. 159
(1966).
20 The taxpayer made arrangements with two banks to take over and manage
four apartment houses held by the banks after foreclosures. In each case a straw
party gave the bank a note secured by a first mortgage on the property and then gave
the taxpayer a second mortgage on each of the properties. The first mortgage liens
totaled $273,000. During the period in which the taxpayer managed the properties,
he paid $14,000 on the mortgages and deducted $45,000 for depreciation. In 1945
the mortgages were in default and the banks took the properties back. The court
held that the taxpayer realized a taxable gain of $31,000 on the foreclosure. The
taxpayer's original basis in the properties, $273,000, was reduced by the amount of
the depreciation deductions, $45,000, and increased by the sum of the payments on
the mortgage, $14,000, to arrive at an adjusted basis of $242,000. On the foreclosure,
the taxpayer realized $273,000, the amount of the mortgage of which he was relieved.
The amount realized, $273,000, minus the adjusted basis, $242,000, resulted in the
taxable gain of $31,000.
21 186 F.2d 455 (1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 926 (1951).
22 186 F-2d at 459.
23 Since Judge Magruder had assigned a zero basis to the property, it may seem
unusual that he had taken into account depreciation deductions in computing the
taxpayer's basis at the time of sale, for technically when one has no basis, he can
take no depreciation deductions. INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, § 167. However, the ap-
proach used by Judge Magruder is proper since in computing basis on sale, the basis
of the property is reduced by the allowed or allowable depreciation deductions.
INT. RExy. CODE OF 1954, § 1016(a) (2). In Parker v. Delaney, the Commissioner had
allowed $28,000 of depreciation expenses over a period of years.
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minus the negative adjusted basis resulted in a taxable gain.24  Al-
though Judge Magruder arrived at the same figure as the majority,
he sanctioned a doctrine which could potentially produce far different
results in subsequent mortgaged property cases.
25
A potential problem created by the Crane and Parker decisions
came to the forefront in Woodsam Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner.
26
In that case the taxpayer was a corporation which had received prop-
erty from a stockholder in an earlier tax-free exchange. The contro-
versy in the case concerned the taxpayer's basis in the property, which,
in turn, depended on the basis of the property in the hands of the
stockholder.'
The stockholder had acquired the property for $300,000. After
her basis in the property had been reduced to $270,000 because of
depreciation deductions, she mortgaged the property for $400,000.2
At this point she transferred the property to the corporation. The
Commissioner maintained that the taxpayer's basis in the property was
its original cost to the stockholder ($300,000) less the depreciation
deductions. The taxpayer, on the other hand, argued that the amount
by which the mortgage exceeded the stockholder's adjusted basis in the
property ($130,000) should have been taxable gain to her at the
time of the transfer, and that the resulting stepped-up basis of $400,000
carried over to the corporation.
In deciding in favor of the Commissioner, the Second Circuit
held that the stockholder never "sold or otherwise dispos[ed] of" the
property within the meaning of section 1001 (a),' and therefore a
taxable event did not occur at the time of the transfer and would only
occur when the property was actually sold. The mortgage did not
change her basis in the property 0
Woodsam Associates is an excellent example of the fuzzy thinking
which exists concerning the taxability of borrowed money. The
24 Amount realized on foreclosure $ 0
Original basis in building $ 0
Minus: Depreciation deductions 45,000
Plus: Mortgage payments 14,000
Minus: Total adjusted basis $-31,000
Taxable gain $ 31,000
2Z See Easson v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1961).
26 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952).
2 7 When the corporation received the property from the stockholder it assumed
her basis in the property. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 113(a) (7), 53 Stat. 41
(now INT. REv. CoD- oF 1954, § 362(b)).
28 Woodsam Associates is the archetype of the negative basis problem which will
be discussed at length below. The negative basis problem arises when property
appreciates in value and is then mortgaged for more than the taxpayer's original basis.
The gain from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the excess
of the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis provided in section
1011 for determining gain ....
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1001 (a).
30 When an individual borrows money, he does not realize a taxable gain. 193
F.2d at 359; 1 MERTENs, FEDmLAL Ixcoam TAxATioN § 5.12, at 32, 34 (rev. ed. 1962);
Spears, Mortgages it; Excess of Basis, U. So. CAs.. 1959 TAx INsT. 883, 885.
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crucial issue is not how the taxpayer disposes of the property but
whether she realizes a gain by disposing of the property and the
corresponding mortgage. Under the court's holding, the stockholder
in Woodsam Associates realized a tax-free profit of $130,000 by mort-
gaging the property for more than her cost and then disposing of it
along with the mortgage." It is important to realize that when the
taxpayer borrows money and is later relieved of the obligation to
repay the loan, he has the unrestricted possession of cash which he did
not have before. Therefore, at the point when the taxpayer is relieved
of the obligation to repay, he realizes a gain on which he should be
taxed.
In Jack L. Easson,a' the Tax Court, when faced with an indis-
tinguishable factual situation,33 recognized the problem posed by the
decision in Woodsam Associates:
It is clear that there will not be a mere postponement of
taxation, but possibly a complete tax exemption, if gain on
the exchange in question is not presently recognized to the
extent that the mortgage to which the transferred property
was subject exceeded the petitioner's adjusted basis. 4
Although Easson was decided in 1960, the events involved occurred
before 1954 so that section 357(c) was not applicable. Since the court
specifically found no evidence of tax avoidance or a sham exchange,
the clear language of section 112(k) (now section 357(a)) would
seem to indicate that there was no taxable gain. The Tax Court,
however, was perplexed by the negative basis problem. If the tax-
payer's original basis in the property were $8 ,000 and the property
were mortgaged for $247,000, the taxpayer'sbasis in the stock re-
ceived in exchange for the property would be -$159,000.31 Citing
the ancient tax maxim that property cannot have a negative 
basis,36
the court concluded that the taxpayer must have realized a taxable
gain of $159,000 on the exchange so that his basis in the stock upon
transfer would be zero. The court looked to 357(c) as proof that
the Code authorized its position. Subsection (c) was not in existence
31 Some writers maintain that the Woodsain result will lead to tax postponement,
not tax avoidance. Cooper, Negative Basis, 75 HA v. L. REV. 1352, 1355 (1962);
Spears, supra note 30, at 886. However, if the stockholder in Woodsam never sells
the stock she received in exchange for the property, she will never pay tax on the
$130,000. See note 44 infra.
3233 T.C. 963 (1960).
33 In 1929 the taxpayer built an apartment house. In 1952 he mortgaged the
property for $250,000. Later that year he incorporated his business and transferred
the property and the mortgage to the corporation. On the day of transfer his basis
in the property was $87,000 and the outstanding mortgage was $247,000. The tax-
payer claimed he realized no gain on the transfer.
34 33 T.C. at 969.
35 Not only would the taxpayer's basis in the stock received in exchange for the
property be negative, but the corporation's basis in the property would also be minus
$159,000. See note 27 supra.
36 33 T.C. at 970 & n.8. See Cooper, supra note 31, at 1353 & authorities cited n.6.
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when the events of this case took place, but the court avoided that
problem by saying that subsection (c) merely clarified existing law.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, 7 holding that the language of sections
112(b) (5) and 112(k) clearly indicated that there was no taxable
gain on the exchange. As for the negative basis problem, the court
looked to Judge Magruder's concurring opinion in Parker as evidence
that a negative basis was a possibility. The court concluded, there-
fore, that the taxpayer did not realize a taxable gain on the exchange
under 112(k) and that the stock he received had a basis of -$159,000.
Furthermore, the legislative history of 357(c) emphasized that the
subsection had no predecessor in the 1939 Code, so that the principles
of that subsection were inapplicable to the facts of this case. To date
the Ninth Circuit is the only court which has allowed a negative basis.3
The Tax Court in Easson was correct in realizing that 357(c)
was adopted to resolve the negative basis problem which first arose in
Woodsam Associates and later in Easson.9  Admittedly, nowhere in
the legislative history of subsection (c) is this purpose clearly
enunciated. Nevertheless, the examples cited in the Treasury Regu-
lations to illustrate the application of sections 357(c) and 358 indicate
that negative basis was the crux of the problem that subsection (c)
was intended to cure.40 Section 358 states, in effect, that the basis
of any stock or securities received in a 351 exchange is the same as
that of the property transferred.4 In example two in the regulations,
an individual owned property with an adjusted basis of $25,000
and a mortgage of $50,000. He transferred the property to a cor-
W7 Easson v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 653 (1961).
381n a case arising in the Third Circuit, the Commissioner was successful in
convincing the court that the taxpayer should be taxed on the difference between his
adjusted basis in the property and the amount of the mortgage assumed by the cor-
poration upon transfer. Simon v. Commissioner, 285 F.2d 422 (3d. Cir. 1960). The
crucial fact in that case was that the taxpayer mortgaged the property only three
months before transferring it to the corporation, and the court held that, in effect,
there was a sale of the property to the corporation with the corporation obtaining
the necessary funds for the purchase by mortgaging the property. Id. at 425.
39 See Advisory Group on Subchapter C of Internal Revenve Code of 1954, Re-
vised Report to the House Suebcommittee on Internal Revenue Taxation of Corpora-
tion Distributions and Adjustments, 86 Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 18, pt. 33, at 548-49
(1959) ; Reply Brief for Respondent, p. 5, Peter Raich, 46 T.C. 604 (1966) ; Cooper,
supra note 31, at 1358-60; Neuhoff, Mortgaging Out and Related Problems, 1961
WAs H. U.L.Q. 132, 143; Schlesinger, Negative Basis, Recognized in. Easson as
Possible, Will Arise Only Rarely, 16 J. TAXATION 212, 213-14 (1962).4 0 Treas. Regs. § 1.357-2 (1955), as amended, T.D. 6528, 1961-1 Cum. BuLL. 79,
81-82 and § 1.358-3(b) (1955).41 In the case of an exchange to which section 351 . . . applies-
(1) The basis of the property permitted to be received under such section
without the recognition of gain or loss shall be the same as that of the
property exchanged-
(A) decreased by-
(i) the fair market value of any other property (except money)
received by the taxpayer . . .
(B) increased by-
(ii) the amount of gain to the taxpayer which was recognized
on such exchange ....
INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 358(a).
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poration in exchange for all of its stock. The individual realized a
taxable gain of $25,000 on the exchange under 357(c), thus in-
creasing his basis in the stock received to zero.' This is exactly the
result the Tax Court reached in Easson; in effect, then, subsection (c)
rejects the theory of both Woodsam Associates and the Court of
Appeals in Easson4
As indicated in the discussion of Woodsam Associates, subsection
(c) is necessary to prevent tax avoidance, not merely tax postpone-
ment. In Woodsam Associates, the stockholder cleared a tax-free
profit of $130,000 on the exchange. Whenever an individual is able
to mortgage property for more than its basis and then dispose of the
property along with the mortgage, he must be taxed on the difference
between his basis and the amount of the mortgage at the time of the
exchange. Otherwise, he may escape taxation altogether." What is
essential to remember is that it is the transferor, not the corporation,
who has received the benefit of the mortgage; therefore, it is the trans-
feror and not the corporation who should be taxed on the difference
between the transferor's original basis and the amount of the mortgage
assumed.
Since 357(c) was adopted in a milieu composed largely of mort-
gaged property cases, the thinking regarding such cases may have a
critical bearing on how the subsection will be applied in other areas.
Unfortunately, some of the conclusions resulting from this discussion
may mislead courts attempting to apply subsection (c) to non-mortgage
cases. First, the mortgaged property doctrine of Crane applies both
to cash and accrual basis taxpayers. With mortgaged property there
is no need to distinguish between cash and accrual basis taxpayers
since they will both treat the mortgage identically for tax purposes.
4'
42 INT. R V. CODE OF 1954, § 358(a) (1) (B) (ii).
43This was the position argued by the taxpayer in Woodsam. The taxpayer
maintained that the stockholder should have realized the tax on the difference between
her original basis and the amount of the mortgage assumed. Had this been the case,
the corporation would have assumed her stepped-up basis of $400,000 in the property
under Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 113(a) (7), 53 Stat. 41 (now INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, §362(b)). See Commissioner v. Corpus Christi Terminal Co., 126 F.2d
898 (5th Cir. 1942).
The attorney for the taxpayer has written an article on mortgaging property
for more than cost. Lurie, Mortgagor's Gain on Mortgaging Property for More
Than Cost Without Personal Liability, 6 TAx L. REv. 319 (1951).
44 Assuming that the taxpayer in Woodsam Associates received stock in exchange.
for the property, she will never pay tax on the $130,000 profit on the exchange if the
value of the property depreciates below the amount of the outstanding mortgage and
is subsequently forfeited. The taxpayer in this case has the unrestricted use of
money with no obligation to repay. She, in effect, has received a windfall unless
she is taxed on the amount of the debt at the time when she is relieved of the obli-
gation to repay the loan. See text accompanying note 31 supra. In addition, even
if the value of the property is always sufficient to satisfy the encumbrance, the tax-
payer will pay no tax if she retains the stock until her death, for the basis in the
stock to her devisee would be its fair market value. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 
1014(a).
Cooper, supra note 31, fails to consider fully these possibilities.
45 The acquisition of a building is a capital expenditure for which no deduction
is allowed for either cash or accrual basis taxpayers. INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954,
§263(a) (1) and Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(a) (1958).
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However, other types of liabilities computed under 357 (c) might
require different treatment by the two types of taxpayers. Second,
the discussion of negative basis causes one to wonder whether prac-
titioners have arrived at a clear understanding of the tax consequences
which should follow when money is borrowed and the debt thereby in-
curred is transferred to another taxpayer. For these reasons, it is not
surprising that there has been little thought about the proper applica-
tion of subsection (c) to cash basis taxpayers in non-mortgage cases.
PETER RAICHi
A recent opinion in the Tax Court should generate some thought
concerning the proper application of subsection (c) to cash basis
taxpayers.4 6 In Raich, a cash basis taxpayer incorporated his sole
proprietorship. On the day of incorporation his balance sheet showed
assets of $88,613.39, including $77,361.66 of trade accounts receivable.
His liabilities totaled $45,992.66, $37,719.78 of which were trade
a~counts payable. The taxpayer personally guaranteed payment of
the accounts receivable. In exchange for these assets, the taxpayer
received stock valued at $25,000 on the corporation's books and a
promissory note for $16,280.58. Thus the corporation's balance sheet
on the day of incorporation showed that the value of the assets trans-
ferred exceeded total liabilities and capital stock by $1,3 40 .' Never-
theless, the Tax Court held that the transferor realized a gain of
$34,741.08, reasoning as follows: since the taxpayer was on the cash
basis, the trade accounts receivable had an adjusted basis of zero."
Therefore, the assets transferred were assigned a value which was
$77,361.66 less than the taxpayer's evaluation, or $11,251.73. The
liabilities assumed, $45,992.81, exceeded the adjusted basis of the
assets by $34,741.08, thus bringing subsection (c) into play.
A handful of cases had arisen before in which accounts receivable
and payable had been involved.49 Admittedly, in each of the cases the
issue did not involve the adjusted basis of the receivables." Never-
46 Peter Raich, 46 T.C. 604 (1966).
47 Assets transferred $88,613.39
Liabilities transferred $45,992.81
Promisory note 16,280.58
Capital stock 25,000.00
Total liabilities $87,273.39
Difference $ 1,340.00
48 For some unexplained reason the court differentiated between the "receivables"
and the "trade accounts receivable" on the taxpayer's balance sheet. The Commis-
sioner permitted the taxpayer to include the -market value of the "receivables,"
$1,833.97, in his adjusted basis for the assets transferred.49 Testor v. Commissioner, 327 F2d 788 (7th Cir. 1964); Arthur L. Kniffen,
39 T.C. 553 (1962); Peter W. DeFelice, 25 CCH Tax Ct Mem. 835 (1966).
60 In Testor, the issue was whether subsection (c) applies if the assets are not
specifically encumbered by the assets transferred. In Kniffem, the issue was whether
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theless, the Commissioner seemed content to assume that if the market
value of the assets transferred was greater than the market value of
the liabilities assumed, then the exchange was tax-free under 357(a).
Apparently the Commissioner has reversed his position in Raich and
will now go beyond a comparison of market values and consider
whether the transferor is on the cash or accrual basis. Since the
Commissioner's stand in Raich appears inconsistent with his earlier
position, the time has come to consider the question more fully.
Before examining the technical tax aspects involved in this ques-
tion, one might consider whether Raich is the type of individual who
should be taxed. It is difficult to understand how he realized a
"gain" by incorporating for he did not "cash out" by holding assets
and transferring the corresponding obligations to another party. Since
Raich personally guaranteed the accounts receivable if they proved
uncollectible, he certainly transferred assets sufficient to pay the
liabilities assumed by the corporation. Furthermore, this is not a case
where the taxpayer incurred a debt, took a deduction for the debt,
and then transferred the debt to a corporation, for, since Raich was
on the cash basis, by definition he could not deduct the accounts pay-
able until he paid them.5 This case is also far different from
Woodsam Associates where the stockholder enjoyed a clear cash
profit of $130,000 on the exchange.' The court itself admits that its
decision might not produce the best policy result:
In applying section 357(c) to the facts herein, we are not
unmindful that the result reached may conflict with the well
established intent of Congress to foster tax-free business re-
organizations. However, in the absence of a clearly expressed
congressional intent, we decline to adopt a construction of
section 357(c) which is supported neither by its language
nor its legislative history.53
As indicated above, the legislative history of subsection (c) is not
very helpful in interpreting the purpose behind the section.54 There-
fore, we must inquire whether the section itself is so clear that the
decision in Raich was dictated by the language of the statute despite
the poor policy result. Is the section as clear as the court implied or
is this a case where the court has not considered carefully the tax
consequences which should follow when a cash basis taxpayer transfers
accounts receivable and payable?
the assumption of a debt owed to the corporation by the transferor was a taxable
event in itself. In DeFelice, the court taxed the transferor on the difference between
the market value of the liabilities assumed and the market value of the assets trans-
ferred.
51 Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c) (1) (i) (1961). An accrual basis taxpayer, on the
other hand, may deduct the accounts payable in the year in which they accrue. Treas.
Reg. § 1.446-1 (c) (1) (ii).
52See note 44 supra.
546 T.C. at 611.
54See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
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The court begins by stating that since the taxpayer was on the
cash basis, the accounts receivable had a basis of zero. It is important
to realize that basis is a tax concept. Therefore, although the accounts
receivable might have a market value of $77,361.66, for tax purposes
they do have a basis of zero in the hands of a cash basis taxpayer since
he has received no money for them and, more importantly, has not
reported them as income." The taxpayer in Raich, however, chose to
base a major part of his attack on this issue. First, he attempted to
distinguish the cases the Commissioner cited for the zero basis prop-
osition in an effort to prove that the receivables should be valued at
market cost.5 6 In the alternative he maintained that even if the re-
ceivables were not valued at market, they should still offset the
payables.5 7  To support this contention the taxpayer tried to prove
that the accounts receivable were encumbered by liens so that as soon
as they were collected, the proceeds would be used to liquidate the
payables. This was the stronger of his two arguments, and the
court never rejected it in theory but merely held that the taxpayer
had failed to prove that the receivables were actually so encumbered.5"
To simplify the issues in Raich, imagine the following hypo-
thetical case. An individual on the cash basis owns a proprietorship
with $100,000 in accounts receivable as the sole asset and $50,000 in
accounts payable as the only liability. If the individual decides to
incorporate his proprietorship, he could conceivably do one of three
things with his receivables and payables. First, he could collect the
receivables, liquidate the payables, pay all income taxes and transfer
the balance in cash to the corporation. As Congress noted when
enacting section 112(k) of the 1939 Code to overrule the Henuler
result, requiring such a practice would make incorporations cumber-
some and difficult.59 Therefore, the individual would probably transfer
all or part of his assets and liabilities to the newly-formed corporation.
In our hypothetical he might transfer either all the receivables or both
55 p. A. Birren & Son v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 718, 720 (7th Cir. 1940) ; Ezo
Products Co., 37 T.C. 385, 393 (1961).
5Brief for Petitioner, pp. 8-25, Peter Raich, 46 T.C. 604 (1966). The Com-
missioner cited P. A. Birren & Son v. Commissioner and Ezo Products Co., supra
note 55.
57 Id. at 22-24.
58 46 T.C. at 610. The theory that if the assets are specifically encumbered by
liabilities, then the transfer will be tax-free provided the liabilities are not greater
in amount than the basis of the assets, is probably another holdover from the mort-
gaged property area. In reality, however, should it make any difference whether
the assets are specifically encumbered by the liabilities transferred in the exchange?
Even though the payables do not specifically encumber the receivables, the payables
still are a cost of producing the receivables and therefore should be set off against
them as if they specifically encumbered the receivables. This is especially true in
this case since the taxpayer guaranteed payment of the receivables if they proved
uncollectible. If the Tax Court in Raich had merely set off the payables against
the receivables, it could have avoided the difficult task of deciding whether the payables
were actually "liabilities" within the meaning of the statute.
59 See note 9 supra.
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the receivables and the payables. 60 In enacting section 112(k) to
counteract Hendler, Congress recognized that if the purpose of the
Internal Revenue Code is to encourage legitimate incorporations, the
tax consequences of transferring all the assets and liabilities of a going
business to a corporation should be no more onerous than the conse-
quences of liquidating all the liabilities before transferring the remain-
ing assets. 61
In our hypothetical, if the taxpayer collects the receivables he will
have $100,000 in taxable income. If he then proceeds to pay the
payables, he can deduct $50,000 from his income for a net taxable
gain of $50,000. Assuming that his tax rate is 50 per cent, he will
have $25,000 in cash remaining after paying his tax for the year. If
instead of liquidating the payables with the proceeds from the re-
ceivables, he transfers both to a corporation; under the Tax Court's
reasoning in Raich, he will realize a taxable gain of $50,000 on the
exchange since the receivables have a basis of zero and the amount of
the payables is $50,000. When the taxpayer transfers the receivables
and payables to a corporation, he is disadvantaged in two respects.
First, after the transfer he has no money left to pay the tax which we
will again assume is 50 per cent, or $25,000. Second, after he pays
the tax he will obviously have no money left, whereas if he had
liquidated the liabilities after collecting the receivables, he would have
had $25,000 left after paying his income tax. Under the Tax
Court's analysis, then, the taxpayer loses $50,000 if he transfers the
assets and liabilities of his proprietorship to the corporation.
This hypothetical should cause one to wonder whether subsection
(c) is as clear as the court implied. The court is correct in holding
that the receivables have a basis of zero, but, as the hypothetical
should indicate, the court stumbles when it considers the other side of
the balance sheet. The court held that the payables in the hands of
the cash basis taxpayer should be valued at their face amount of
$37,719.78. It seems incongruous that the receivables had a basis of
zero while the payables were valued at market. Either both might
be valued at market " or both might be valued at zero, but to combine
the two results makes neither tax nor accounting good sense.
If the court is correct in holding that the receivables have a basis
of zero, then the payables must also be accounted for at zero for tax
OA fourth possibility would be to transfer only the payables to the corporation.
However, since such a transfer would probably be construed as tax avoidance, the
Commissioner would most likely tax the entire transaction under Section 357(b).
See note 12 supra.
61 See note 9 supra.
6
2 It is maintained below that the payables and receivables of a cash basis tax-
payer should not be valued at market but should be valued at zero. In one sense,
however, it is possible to value the receivables at market. If one considers the
payables as a cost of producing the receivables, then it is proper to value the receiv-
ables at market to the extent of the payables. See note 58 supra.
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purposes.' Perhaps the court's thinking became snarled over the
word "liabilities" in subsection (c). "Liability" has both an account-
ing and a tax definition. Certainly, in Raich the taxpayer would in-
clude an accounts payable liability of $37,719.78 on his business
balance sheet. The business balance sheet, however, is not necessarily
synonymous with the tax balance sheet. For tax purposes, a cash
basis taxpayer has no "liabilities" until he has actually paid them and
been allowed a deduction for them. 4 Thus, although it may seem
artificial to say that in Raich the taxpayer's payables are not a liability
to him, nevertheless, for tax purposes they are not until he actually
pays them and receives a deduction. The situation is analogous to the
receivables. The receivables do not appear on the tax balance sheet
until the money is actually received and reported as income. Likewise,
the payables do not appear on the tax balance sheet until they are paid
and deducted.
Consider once again the hypothetical, but this time assume that
the payables are valued at zero. When the taxpayer transfers the
payables and receivables to the corporation, he recognizes no taxable
gain. It is true that by transferring the receivables and the payables
to the corporation he has temporarily avoided paying $25,000 in federal
income tax. At the same time, however, after paying the tax he does
not have the $25,000 in cash remaining that he would have incurred
had he kept the receivables and liquidated the payables.
This hypothetical serves to point up another inequity in the court's
decision. If the payables are valued at market, no one will ever get
a deduction when they are liquidated. Because the taxpayer is on the
cash basis, he cannot deduct the payables since he did not pay them
himself. The corporation, however, also cannot claim a deduction
since when it pays the payables, it will merely be paying off an expense
already recognized by another taxpayer."
Consider once more the hypothetical and follow it one more step
to its natural conclusion. Under section 362(b), the corporation
63 Neither the Internal Revenue Code nor the Treasury Regulations are as pre-
cise on this point as they should be. Nevertheless, both the Code and the Regulation
lend support to this conclusion. Section 1012 of the Code states that "the basis of
property shall be the cost of such property . . ." The Regulations are slightly
more specific: "In general, the basis of property is the cost thereof. The cost is the
amount paid for such property in cash or other property." Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1 (a)
(1966). The Regulations also state: "Generally, under the cash receipts and disburse-
ments method in the computation of taxable income ..... expenditures are to be
deducted for the taxable year in which actually made." Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1 (c) (1) (i)
(1961). Since a cash basis taxpayer has paid nothing in cash for his accounts pay-
able and cannot deduct them until he does so, they should be valued at zero until
such time as he actually does pay them.
04If the taxpayer in Raich had not incorporated and had claimed a deduction for
the payables without actually paying them, the Commissioner would have disallowed
the deduction because the taxpayer was on the cash basis. Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1 (a)
(1966) ; 2 MERTENS, FEDmRAL INCOME TAXATION § 12.53, at 147 & n.29 (rev. ed. 1961).
6 See Paul & Kalish, Transition from a Partnership to a Corporation, N.Y.U.
18TH INST. ON FED. TAX 639, 656-57 (1960) ; Tritt & Spencer, Current Tax Problems
in Incorporation of a Going Business, U. So. CA.L. 1958 TAx INsT. 71, 98-99.
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assumes the transferor's basis in the property transferred.6 Under
the interpretation advanced above, the basis would be zero since both
the receivables and the payables are valued at zero when they are
transferred. The corporation will get the benefit of the $50,000 de-
duction for the payables, but will also have to pay tax on the $100,000
of receivables.67
Upon transferring the assets and liabilities to the corporation, the
taxpayer received stock in the corporation. The basis of the stock in
the transferor's hands is the adjusted basis of the assets transferred,
or, in the hypothetical, zero.6" Presumably, on the day of transfer the
transferor could sell the stock for $50,000, the net worth of the cor-
poration, and incur a taxable gain of $50,000. The taxpayer's taxable
gain on the entire transaction is the same as if he kept the payables and
used the receipts from the receivables to liquidate them, but by trans-
ferring the assets and liabilities to the corporation, he has postponed
the time when he would realize that taxable gain. A transfer of
accounts receivable and payable by a cash basis taxpayer to a cor-
poration is thus a complete wash, as it should be, and the taxable gain,
if any, is postponed until the taxpayer disposes of the stock he receives
in exchange for the assets.
Applying the Tax Court's holding in Raich to this hypothetical,
one can see that the taxpayer in Raich will eventually pay a double
tax if he disposes of the stock he received in exchange for the assets
of his business. The Tax Court would hold in this hypothetical that
the taxpayer realized a taxable gain of $50,000 upon transferring the
assets and liabilities of his business to a corporation, since the re-
ceivables have a basis of zero and the payables are valued" at $50,000.
Since the assets he transferred are valued at zero, the stock he receives
in exchange for the assets is also valued at zero under section 358(a).
The taxpayer, however, is allowed to increase his basis in the stock
by the amount of the taxable gain he realized on the transfer, or
$50,000 in the hypothetical. Under section 358(d),69 however, he is
required to reduce his basis in the stock by the amount of the liabilities
assumed by the corporation, or $50,000. This provision, in effect,
offsets the credit allowed for the tax paid so that the taxpayer's basis
in the stock is again reduced to zero. Consequently, when the tax-
66 If property was acquired by a corporation in connection with a reorgani-
zation to which this part applies, then the basis shall be the same as it would
be in the hands of the transferor, increased in the amount of gain recognized
to the transferor on such transfer.
INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, § 362(b).
67 See, e.g., P. A. Birren & Son, Inc. v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 718 (7th Cir.
1940) ; Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310
U.S. 650 (1940).
68 See note 41 supra.
69 (d) AssUMPTIoN OF LIABILiY-Where, as part of the consideration to the
taxpayer, another party to the exchange assumed a liability of the taxpayer
or acquired from the taxpayer property subject to a liability, such assumption
or acquisition (in the amount of the liability) shall, for purposes of this
section, be treated as money received by the taxpayer on the exchange.
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payer sells the stock he will realize another taxable gain of $50,000,
or a total taxable gain of $100,000. The inequity in the Tax Court's
holding is that the taxpayer is taxed twice when his debts are assumed
by another party. First, he must pay a tax on the amount of the
liabilities assumed when the debt is transferred. Second, he loses the
credit for this tax since he must reduce his basis in the stock by the
amount of the debt assumed.
At this juncture the question arises whether or not 357(c)
would ever apply to accounts receivable and payable. If a cash basis
taxpayer transfers only receivables and payables to a corporation,
subsection (c) should not apply.70 Consider the accrual basis tax-
payer, however. Clearly, if he transfers $100,000 in accounts re-
ceivable and $50,000 in accounts payable to a corporation, he has not
recognized a taxable gain. 71  This result follows naturally from the
discussion above. The taxpayer has transferred sufficient assets to
liquidate the liabilities assumed. Although he has been allowed a de-
duction for the payables since he is on the accrual method, he never-
theless also has paid tax on the receivables. In this case, the taxpayer
has not realized a gain by transferring the receivables and payables to
the corporation.
If the figures are reversed, however, the result is different. If an
accrual basis taxpayer conveys $50,000 in receivables and $100,000 in
payables, he realizes a taxable gain of $50,000 under 357(c) in
order to prevent the stock received in exchange from having a nega-
tive basis. The taxpayer has, in effect, dumped a liability of $50,000
on the corporation which he will not have to pay. At the same time,
he has gained a tax benefit of $50,000 since his deduction for the
payables exceeded his tax on the receivables by $50,000. In such a
case, it is only just that he be taxed on the transfer.
In conclusion, then, if only accounts receivable and payable are
transferred to a corporation, a taxable event should not occur under
357(c) unless the taxpayer is on the accrual method and the cor-
poration assumes liabilities greater in amount than the basis of the
assets transferred.
7oThis, of course, assumes that the Commissioner does not conclude that the
purpose behind the transfer was tax avoidance or that the transfer was not a legitimate
business deal. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 357(b).
71 This statement assumes that the receivables do not appreciate in value while in
the hands of the taxpayer. If the taxpayer's original basis in the receivables and
his basis at the time of transfer are the same, this statement is correct.
